.pl 10.0i
   .po 0
   .ll 7.2i
   .lt 7.2i
   .nr LL 7.2i
   .nr LT 7.2i
   .ds LF Riikonen
   .ds RF FORMFEED[Page %]
   .ds CF
  .ds LH Internet-Draft
  .ds RH 15 January 2007
  .ds CH
  .na
  .hy 0
  .in 0
  .nf
  Network Working Group                                        P. Riikonen
  Internet-Draft
  draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-09.txt                       15 January 2007
  Expires: 15 July 2007
  
  .in 3
  
  .ce 2
  SILC Key Exchange and Authentication Protocols
  <draft-riikonen-silc-ke-auth-09.txt>
  
  .ti 0
  Status of this Draft
  
  By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
  applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
  have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
  aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
  
  Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
  Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
  other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
  Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of
  six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
  documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as
  reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress".
  
  The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
  The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
  http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
  
  
  .ti 0
  Abstract
  
  This memo describes two protocols used in the Secure Internet Live
  Conferencing (SILC) protocol, specified in the Secure Internet Live
  Conferencing, Protocol Specification [SILC1].  The SILC Key Exchange
  (SKE) protocol provides secure key exchange between two parties
  resulting into shared secret key material.  The protocol is based
  on Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality is
  derived from several key exchange protocols.
  
  The second protocol, SILC Connection Authentication protocol provides
  user level authentication used when creating connections in SILC
  network.  The protocol supports passphrase (pre-shared secret)
  authentication and public key (and certificate) authentication based
  on digital signatures.
  
  
  
  .ti 0
  Table of Contents
  
  .nf
  1 Introduction ..................................................  2
    1.1 Requirements Terminology ..................................  3
  2 SILC Key Exchange Protocol ....................................  3
    2.1 Key Exchange Payloads .....................................  4
        2.1.1 Key Exchange Start Payload ..........................  4
        2.1.2 Key Exchange Payload ................................  9
    2.2 Key Exchange Procedure .................................... 11
    2.3 Processing the Key Material ............................... 13
    2.4 SILC Key Exchange Groups .................................. 15
        2.4.1 diffie-hellman-group1 ............................... 15
        2.4.2 diffie-hellman-group2 ............................... 15
        2.4.3 diffie-hellman-group3 ............................... 16
    2.5 Key Exchange Status Types ................................. 16
  3 SILC Connection Authentication Protocol ....................... 18
    3.1 Connection Auth Payload ................................... 19
    3.2 Connection Authentication Types ........................... 20
        3.2.1 Passphrase Authentication ........................... 20
        3.2.2 Public Key Authentication ........................... 21
    3.3 Connection Authentication Status Types .................... 21
  4 Security Considerations ....................................... 22
  5 References .................................................... 22
  6 Author's Address .............................................. 23
  7 Full Copyright Statement ...................................... 24
  
  
  .ti 0
  List of Figures
 
 .nf
 Figure 1:  Key Exchange Start Payload
 Figure 2:  Key Exchange Payload
 Figure 3:  Connection Auth Payload
 
 
 .ti 0
 1 Introduction
 
 This memo describes two protocols used in the Secure Internet Live
 Conferencing (SILC) protocol specified in the Secure Internet Live
 Conferencing, Protocol Specification [SILC1].  The SILC Key Exchange
 (SKE) protocol provides secure key exchange between two parties
 resulting into shared secret key material.  The protocol is based on
 Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality is derived
 from several key exchange protocols, such as SSH2 Key Exchange protocol,
 Station-To-Station (STS) protocol and the OAKLEY Key Determination
 protocol [OAKLEY].
 
 The second protocol, SILC Connection Authentication protocol provides
 user level authentication used when creating connections in SILC
 network.  The protocol supports passphrase (pre-shared secret)
 authentication and public key (and certificate) authentication based
 on digital signatures.
 
 The basis of secure SILC session requires strong and secure key exchange
 protocol and authentication.  The authentication protocol is secured and
 no authentication data is ever sent in the network without encrypting
 and authenticating it first.  Thus, authentication protocol may be used
 only after the key exchange protocol has been successfully completed.
 
 This document constantly refers to other SILC protocol specifications
 that should be read to be able to fully understand the functionality
 and purpose of these protocols.  The most important references are
 the Secure Internet Live Conferencing, Protocol Specification [SILC1]
 and the SILC Packet Protocol [SILC2].
 
 The protocol is intended to be used with the SILC protocol thus it
 does not define own framework that could be used.  The framework is
 provided by the SILC protocol.
 
 
 .ti 0
 1.1 Requirements Terminology
 
 The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED,
 MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this document, are to be
 interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
 
 
 .ti 0
 2 SILC Key Exchange Protocol
 
 SILC Key Exchange Protocol (SKE) is used to exchange shared secret
 material used to secure the communication channel.  The protocol use
 Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm and its functionality is derived
 from several key exchange protocols, such as SSH2 Key Exchange protocol,
 Station-To-Station (STS) protocol and the OAKLEY Key Determination
 protocol [OAKLEY].  The protocol does not claim any conformance
 to any of these protocols, they were only used as a reference when
 designing this protocol.  The protocol can mutually authenticate the
 negotiating parties during the key exchange.
 
 The purpose of SILC Key Exchange protocol is to create session keys to
 be used in current SILC session.  The keys are valid only for some period
 of time (usually an hour) or at most until the session ends.  These keys
 are used to protect packets traveling between the two entities.
 Usually all traffic is secured with the key material derived from this
 protocol.
 
 The Diffie-Hellman implementation used in the SILC SHOULD be compliant
 to the PKCS #3.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.1 Key Exchange Payloads
 
 During the key exchange procedure public data is sent between initiator
 and responder.  This data is later used in the key exchange procedure.
 There are several payloads used in the key exchange.  As for all SILC
 packets, SILC Packet Header, described in [SILC2], is at the beginning
 of all packets sent in during this protocol.  All the fields in the
 following payloads are in MSB (most significant byte first) order.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.1.1 Key Exchange Start Payload
 
 The key exchange between two entities MUST be started by sending the
 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet containing Key Exchange Start Payload.
 Initiator sends the Key Exchange Start Payload to the responder filled
 with all security properties it supports.  The responder then checks
 whether it supports the security properties.
 
 It then sends a Key Exchange Start Payload to the initiator filled with
 security properties it selected from the original payload.  The payload
 sent by responder MUST include only one chosen property per list.  The
 character encoding for the security property values as defined in [SILC1]
 SHOULD be UTF-8 [RFC2279] in Key Exchange Start Payload.
 
 The Key Exchange Start Payload is used to tell connecting entities what
 security properties and algorithms should be used in the communication.
 The Key Exchange Start Payload is sent only once per session.  Even if
 the PFS (Perfect Forward Secrecy) flag is set the Key Exchange Start
 Payload is not re-sent.  When PFS is desired the Key Exchange Payloads
 are sent to negotiate new key material.  The procedure is equivalent to
 the very first negotiation except that the Key Exchange Start Payload
 is not sent.
 
 As this payload is used only with the very first key exchange the payload
 is never encrypted, as there are no keys to encrypt it with.
 
 A cookie is also sent in this payload.  A cookie is used to randomize the
 payload so that none of the key exchange parties can determine this
 payload before the key exchange procedure starts.  The cookie MUST be
 returned to the original sender unmodified by the responder.
 
 Following diagram represents the Key Exchange Start Payload.  The lists
 mentioned below are always comma (`,') separated and the list MUST NOT
 include white spaces (` ').
 
 
 .in 5
 .nf
                      1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |   RESERVED    |     Flags     |         Payload Length        |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 +                                                               +
 |                                                               |
 +                            Cookie                             +
 |                                                               |
 +                                                               +
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Version String Length     |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                         Version String                        ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |   Key Exchange Grp Length     |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                      Key Exchange Groups                      ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |        PKCS Alg Length        |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                         PKCS Algorithms                       ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |     Encryption Alg Length     |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                      Encryption Algorithms                    ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |       Hash Alg Length         |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                         Hash Algorithms                       ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |         HMAC Length           |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                             HMACs                             ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |    Compression Alg Length     |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                     Compression Algorithms                    ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 .in 3
 
 .ce
 Figure 1:  Key Exchange Start Payload
 
 
 .in 6
 o RESERVED (1 byte) - Reserved field.  Sender fills this with
   zero (0) value.
 
 o Flags (1 byte) - Indicates flags to be used in the key
   exchange.  Several flags can be set at once by ORing the
   flags together.  The following flags are reserved for this
   field:
 
      No flags                 0x00
 
        In this case the field is ignored.
 
      IV Included              0x01
 
        This flag is used to indicate that Initialization
        Vector (IV) in encryption will be included in the
        ciphertext which the recipient must use in decryption.
        At the beginning of the SILC packet, before the SILC
        Packet header an 8-bit Security ID (SID) MUST be
        placed.  After the SID, the IV MUST be placed.  After
        the IV, a 32-bit MSB first ordered packet sequence
        number MUST be placed.  The SID and IV MUST NOT be
        encrypted, but the sequence number MUST be included
        in encryption.  The recipient MUST use the sequence
        number during MAC verification [SILC2].  All fields
        however are authenticated with MAC.
 
        The Security ID is set to value 0 when the key
        exchange is performed for the first time.  It is
        monotonically increased after each re-key, wrapping
        eventually.  The SID in combination with the current
        session can be used to identify which key has been
        used to encrypt an incoming packet.  This is especially
        important after rekey when using UDP/IP protocol,
        where packets may be lost or reordered.  A packet with
        unknown SID will result into discarding the packet as
        it cannot be decrypted.  After rekey, implementation
        should understand that it may still receive packets
        with old SID and be prepared to decrypt them with the
        old key.
 
        With this flag it is possible to use SILC protocol on
        unreliable transport such as UDP/IP which may cause
        packet reordering and packet losses.  By default,
        this flag is not set and thus IV is not included
        in the ciphertext.  Setting this flag increases the
        packet length by one ciphertext block plus 1 byte for
        the Security ID and 32 bits for the sequence number.
        Responder MAY override this flag for the initiator,
        however without this flag UDP connection cannot be
        used.  The flag MAY also be used in TCP connection.
 
        When using with UDP/IP implementations SHOULD use
        anti-replay methods where an anti-replay window
        defines what packets are replays.  An example of
        anti-window protocol is in [RFC2406] Section 3.4.2
        with example source code in [RFC2401] Appendix C.
        While [RFC2401] and [RFC2406] does not relate to SILC,
        the anti-replay method used is applicable in SILC.
 
      PFS                      0x02
 
        Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) to be used in the
        key exchange protocol.  If not set, re-keying
        is performed using the old key.  See the [SILC1]
        for more information on this issue.  When PFS is
        used, re-keying and creating new keys for any
        particular purpose MUST cause new key exchange with
        new Diffie-Hellman exponent values.  In this key
        exchange only the Key Exchange Payload is sent and
        the Key Exchange Start Payload MUST NOT be sent.
        When doing PFS the Key Exchange Payloads are
        encrypted with the old keys.
 
      Mutual Authentication    0x04
 
        Both of the parties will perform authentication
        by providing signed data for the other party to
        verify.  By default, only responder will provide
        the signature data.  If this is set then the
        initiator must also provide it.  Initiator MAY
        set this but also responder MAY set this even if
        initiator did not set it.
 
      Rest of the flags are reserved for the future and
      MUST NOT be set.
 
 o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length of the entire Key Exchange
   Start payload, not including any other field.
 
 o Cookie (16 bytes) - Cookie that randomize this payload so
   that each of the party cannot determine the payload before
   hand.  This field MUST be present.
 
 o Version String Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Version
   String field, not including any other field.
 
 o Version String (variable length) - Indicates the version of
   the sender of this payload.  Initiator sets this when sending
   the payload and responder sets this when it replies by sending
   this payload.  See [SILC1] for definition for the version
   string format.  This field MUST be present and include valid
   version string.
 
 o Key Exchange Grp Length (2 bytes) - The length of the
   key exchange group list, not including any other field.
 
 o Key Exchange Group (variable length) - The list of
   key exchange groups.  See the section 2.4 SILC Key Exchange
   Groups for definitions of these groups.  This field MUST
   be present.
 
 o PKCS Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the PKCS algorithms
   list, not including any other field.
 
 o PKCS Algorithms (variable length) - The list of PKCS
   algorithms.  This field MUST be present.
 
 o Encryption Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the encryption
   algorithms list, not including any other field.
 
 o Encryption Algorithms (variable length) - The list of
   encryption algorithms.  This field MUST be present.
 
 o Hash Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Hash algorithm
   list, not including any other field.
 
 o Hash Algorithms (variable length) - The list of Hash
   algorithms.  The hash algorithms are mainly used in the
   SKE protocol.  This field MUST be present.
 
 o HMAC Length (2 bytes) - The length of the HMAC list, not
   including any other field.
 
 o HMACs (variable length) - The list of HMACs.  The HMAC's
   are used to compute the Message Authentication Code (MAC)
   of the SILC packets.  This field MUST be present.
 
 o Compression Alg Length (2 bytes) - The length of the
   compression algorithms list, not including any other field.
 
 o Compression Algorithms (variable length) - The list of
   compression algorithms.  This field MAY be omitted.
 .in 3
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.1.2 Key Exchange Payload
 
 Key Exchange payload is used to deliver the public key (or certificate),
 the computed Diffie-Hellman public value and possibly signature data
 from one party to the other.  When initiator is using this payload
 and the Mutual Authentication flag is not set then the initiator MUST
 NOT provide the signature data.  If the flag is set then the initiator
 MUST provide the signature data so that the responder can verify it.
 
 The Mutual Authentication flag is usually used when a separate
 authentication protocol will not be executed for the initiator of the
 protocol.  This is case for example when the SKE is performed between
 two SILC clients.  In normal case, where client is connecting to a
 server, or server is connecting to a router the Mutual Authentication
 flag MAY be omitted.  However, if the connection authentication protocol
 for the connecting entity is not based on digital signatures (it is
 based on pre-shared key or there is no authentication) then the Mutual
 Authentication flag SHOULD be enabled.  This way the connecting entity
 has to provide proof of possession of the private key for the public key
 it will provide in this protocol.
 
 When performing re-key with PFS selected this is the only payload that
 is sent in the SKE protocol.  The Key Exchange Start Payload MUST NOT
 be sent at all.  However, this payload does not have all the fields
 present.  In the re-key with PFS the public key and a possible signature
 data SHOULD NOT be present.  If they are present they MUST be ignored.
 The only field that is present is the Public Data that is used to create
 the new key material.  In the re-key the Mutual Authentication flag, that
 may be set in the initial negotiation, MUST also be ignored.
 
 This payload is sent inside SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1 and inside
 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_2 packet types.  The initiator uses the
 SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_1 and the responder the latter.
 
 The following diagram represent the Key Exchange Payload.
 
 
 .in 5
 .nf
                      1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |       Public Key Length       |        Public Key Type        |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 ~            Public Key of the party (or certificate)           ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |       Public Data Length      |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                          Public Data                          ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |        Signature Length       |                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                               +
 |                                                               |
 ~                        Signature Data                         ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 .in 3
 
 .ce
 Figure 2:  Key Exchange Payload
 
 
 .in 6
 o Public Key Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Public Key
   (or certificate) field, not including any other field.
 
 o Public Key Type (2 bytes) - The public key (or certificate)
   type.  This field indicates the type of the public key in
   the packet.  Following types are defined:
 
      1    SILC style public key (mandatory)
      2    SSH2 style public key (optional)
      3    X.509 Version 3 certificate (optional)
      4    OpenPGP certificate (optional)
      5    SPKI certificate (optional)
 
   The only required type to support is type number 1.  See
   [SILC1] for the SILC public key specification.  See
   SSH2 public key specification in [SSH-TRANS].  See X.509v3
   certificate specification in [PKIX-Part1].  See OpenPGP
   certificate specification in [PGP].  See SPKI certificate
   specification in [SPKI].  If this field includes zero (0)
   or unsupported type number the protocol MUST be aborted
   sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE message and the connection SHOULD
   be closed immediately.
 
 o Public Key (or certificate) (variable length) - The
   public key or certificate of the party.  This public key
   may be used to verify the digital signature.  The public key
   or certificate in this field is encoded in the manner as
   defined in their respective definitions; see previous field.
 
 o Public Data Length (2 bytes) - The length of the Public Data
   field, not including any other field.
 
 o Public Data (variable length) - The public data to be
   sent to the receiver (computed Diffie-Hellman public values).
   See section 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure for detailed description
   how this field is computed.  This field is MP integer and is
   encoded as defined in [SILC1].
 
 o Signature Length (2 bytes) - The length of the signature,
   not including any other field.
 
 o Signature Data (variable length) - The signature signed
   by the sender.  The receiver of this signature MUST
   verify it.  The verification is done using the sender's
   public key.  See section 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure for
   detailed description how to produce the signature.  If
   the Mutual Authentication flag is not set then initiator
   MUST NOT provide this field and the Signature Length field
   MUST be set to zero (0) value.  If the flag is set then
   also the initiator MUST provide this field.  The responder
   always MUST provide this field.  The encoding for signature
   is defined in [SILC1].
 .in 3
 
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.2 Key Exchange Procedure
 
 The key exchange begins by sending SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet with
 Key Exchange Start Payload to select the security properties to be used
 in the key exchange and later in the communication.
 
 After Key Exchange Start Payload has been processed by both of the
 parties the protocol proceeds as follows:
 
 
 Setup:  p is a large and public safe prime.  This is one of the
         Diffie Hellman groups.  q is order of subgroup (largest
         prime factor of p).  g is a generator and is defined
         along with the Diffie Hellman group.
 
     1.  Initiator generates a random number x, where 1 < x < q,
         and computes e = g ^ x mod p.  The result e is then
         encoded into Key Exchange Payload, with the public key
         (or certificate) and sent to the responder.
 
         If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then initiator
         MUST also produce signature data SIGN_i which the responder
         will verify.  The initiator MUST compute a hash value
         HASH_i = hash(Initiator's Key Exchange Start Payload |
         public key (or certificate) | e).  The '|' stands for
         concatenation.  It then signs the HASH_i value with its
         private key resulting a signature SIGN_i.
 
     2.  Responder generates a random number y, where 1 < y < q,
         and computes f = g ^ y mod p.  It then computes the
         shared secret KEY = e ^ y mod p, and, a hash value
         HASH = hash(Initiator's Key Exchange Start Payload |
         public key (or certificate) | Initiator's public key
         (or certificate) | e | f | KEY).  It then signs
         the HASH value with its private key resulting a signature
         SIGN.
 
         It then encodes its public key (or certificate), f and
         SIGN into Key Exchange Payload and sends it to the
         initiator.
 
         If the Mutual Authentication flag is set then the responder
         SHOULD verify that the public key provided in the payload
         is authentic, or if certificates are used it verifies the
         certificate.  The responder MAY accept the public key without
         verifying it, however, doing so may result to insecure key
         exchange (accepting the public key without verifying may be
         desirable for practical reasons on many environments.  For
         long term use this is never desirable, in which case
         certificates would be the preferred method to use).  It then
         computes the HASH_i value the same way initiator did in the
         phase 1.  It then verifies the signature SIGN_i from the
         payload with the hash value HASH_i using the received public
         key.
 
     3.  Initiator verifies that the public key provided in
         the payload is authentic, or if certificates are used
         it verifies the certificate.  The initiator MAY accept
         the public key without verifying it, however, doing
         so may result to insecure key exchange (accepting the
         public key without verifying may be desirable for
         practical reasons on many environments.  For long term
         use this is never desirable, in which case certificates
         would be the preferred method to use).
 
         Initiator then computes the shared secret KEY =
         f ^ x mod p, and, a hash value HASH in the same way as
         responder did in phase 2.  It then verifies the
         signature SIGN from the payload with the hash value
         HASH using the received public key.
 
 
 If any of these phases is to fail the SILC_PACKET_FAILURE MUST be sent
 to indicate that the key exchange protocol has failed, and the connection
 SHOULD be closed immediately.  Any other packets MUST NOT be sent or
 accepted during the key exchange except the SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE_*,
 SILC_PACKET_FAILURE and SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packets.
 
 The result of this protocol is a shared secret key material KEY and
 a hash value HASH.  The key material itself is not fit to be used as
 a key, it needs to be processed further to derive the actual keys to be
 used.  The key material is also used to produce other security parameters
 later used in the communication.  See section 2.3 Processing the Key
 Material for detailed description how to process the key material.
 
 If the Mutual Authentication flag was set the protocol produces also
 a hash value HASH_i.  This value, however, must be discarded.
 
 After the keys are processed the protocol is ended by sending the
 SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet.  Both entities send this packet to
 each other.  After this both parties MUST start using the new keys.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.3 Processing the Key Material
 
 Key Exchange protocol produces secret shared key material KEY.  This
 key material is used to derive the actual keys used in the encryption
 of the communication channel.  The key material is also used to derive
 other security parameters used in the communication.  Key Exchange
 protocol produces a hash value HASH as well.
 
 The keys MUST be derived from the key material as follows:
 
 .in 6
 Sending Initial Vector (IV)     = hash(0x0 | KEY | HASH)
 Receiving Initial Vector (IV)   = hash(0x1 | KEY | HASH)
 Sending Encryption Key          = hash(0x2 | KEY | HASH)
 Receiving Encryption Key        = hash(0x3 | KEY | HASH)
 Sending HMAC Key                = hash(0x4 | KEY | HASH)
 Receiving HMAC Key              = hash(0x5 | KEY | HASH)
 .in 3
 
 
 The Initial Vector (IV) is used in the encryption when doing for
 example CBC mode.  As many bytes as needed are taken from the start of
 the hash output for IV.  Sending IV is for sending key and receiving IV
 is for receiving key.  For receiving party, the receiving IV is actually
 sender's sending IV, and, the sending IV is actually sender's receiving
 IV.  Initiator uses IV's as they are (sending IV for sending and
 receiving IV for receiving).
 
 The Encryption Keys are derived as well from the hash().  If the hash()
 output is too short for the encryption algorithm more key material MUST
 be produced in the following manner:
 
 .in 6
 K1 = hash(0x2 | KEY | HASH)
 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2)  ...
 
 Sending Encryption Key = K1 | K2 | K3 ...
 
 
 K1 = hash(0x3 | KEY | HASH)
 K2 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1)
 K3 = hash(KEY | HASH | K1 | K2)  ...
 
 Receiving Encryption Key = K1 | K2 | K3 ...
 .in 3
 
 
 The key is distributed by hashing the previous hash with the original
 key material.  The final key is a concatenation of the hash values.
 For Receiving Encryption Key the procedure is equivalent.  Sending key
 is used only for encrypting data to be sent.  The receiving key is used
 only to decrypt received data.  For receiving party, the receive key is
 actually sender's sending key, and, the sending key is actually sender's
 receiving key.  Initiator uses generated keys as they are (sending key
 for sending and receiving key for receiving).
 
 The HMAC keys are used to create MAC values to packets in the
 communication channel.  As many bytes as needed are taken from the start
 of the hash output to generate the MAC keys.
 
 These procedures are performed by all parties of the key exchange
 protocol.  This MUST be done before the protocol has been ended by
 sending the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet, to assure that parties can
 successfully process the key material.
 
 This same key processing procedure MAY be used in the SILC in some
 other circumstances as well.  Any changes to this procedure is defined
 separately when this procedure is needed.  See the [SILC1] and the
 [SILC2] for these circumstances.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.4 SILC Key Exchange Groups
 
 The Following groups may be used in the SILC Key Exchange protocol.
 The first group diffie-hellman-group1 is REQUIRED, other groups MAY be
 negotiated to be used in the connection with Key Exchange Start Payload
 and SILC_PACKET_KEY_EXCHANGE packet.  However, the first group MUST be
 proposed in the Key Exchange Start Payload regardless of any other
 requested group (however, it does not have to be the first in the list).
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.4.1 diffie-hellman-group1
 
 The length of this group is 1024 bits.  This is REQUIRED group.
 The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
 
 Its hexadecimal value is
 
 .in 6
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
 .in 3
 
 
 The generator used with this prime is g = 2.  The group order q is
 (p - 1) / 2.
 
 This group was taken from RFC 2412.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.4.2 diffie-hellman-group2
 
 The length of this group is 1536 bits.  This is OPTIONAL group.
 The prime is 2^1536 - 2^1472 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1406 pi] + 741804 }.
 
 Its hexadecimal value is
 
 .in 6
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D
 C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F
 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
 .in 3
 
 The generator used with this prime is g = 2.  The group order q is
 (p - 1) / 2.
 
 This group was taken from RFC 3526.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.4.3 diffie-hellman-group3
 
 The length of this group is 2048 bits.  This is OPTIONAL group.
 This prime is: 2^2048 - 2^1984 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^1918 pi] + 124476 }.
 
 Its hexadecimal value is
 
 .in 6
 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D
 C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F
 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B
 E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9
 DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510
 15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
 .in 3
 
 The generator used with this prime is g = 2.  The group order q is
 (p - 1) / 2.
 
 This group was taken from RFC 3526.
 
 Additional larger groups are defined in RFC 3526 and may be used in SKE
 by defining name for them using the above name format.
 
 
 .ti 0
 2.5 Key Exchange Status Types
 
 This section defines all key exchange protocol status types that may
 be returned in the SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS or SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packets
 to indicate the status of the protocol.  Implementations may map the
 status types to human readable error message.  All types except the
 SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK type MUST be sent in SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
 The length of status is 32 bits (4 bytes).  The following status types
 are defined:
 
 .in 6
 0   SILC_SKE_STATUS_OK
 
     Protocol were executed successfully.
 
 
 1   SILC_SKE_STATUS_ERROR
 
     Unknown error occurred.  No specific error type is defined.
 
 
 2   SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_PAYLOAD
 
     Provided KE payload were malformed or included bad fields.
 
 
 3   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_GROUP
 
     None of the provided groups were supported.
 
 
 4   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER
 
     None of the provided ciphers were supported.
 
 
 5   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PKCS
 
     None of the provided public key algorithms were supported.
 
 
 6   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_FUNCTION
 
     None of the provided hash functions were supported.
 
 
 7   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_HMAC
 
     None of the provided HMACs were supported.
 
 
 8   SILC_SKE_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY
 
     Provided public key type is not supported.
 
 
 9   SILC_SKE_STATUS_INCORRECT_SIGNATURE
 
     Provided signature was incorrect.
 
 
 10  SILC_SKE_STATUS_BAD_VERSION
 
     Provided version string was not acceptable.
 
 
 11  SILC_SKE_STATUS_INVALID_COOKIE
 
     The cookie in the Key Exchange Start Payload was malformed,
     because responder modified the cookie.
 .in 3
 
 
 .ti 0
 3 SILC Connection Authentication Protocol
 
 Purpose of Connection Authentication protocol is to authenticate the
 connecting party with server.  Usually connecting party is client but
 server may connect to router server as well.  Its other purpose is to
 provide information for the server about which type of entity the
 connection is.  The type defines whether the connection is client,
 server or router connection.  Server use this information to create the
 ID for the connection.
 
 Server MUST verify the authentication data received and if it is to fail
 the authentication MUST be failed by sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
 If authentication is successful the protocol is ended by server by sending
 SILC_PACKET_SUCCESS packet.
 
 The protocol is executed after the SILC Key Exchange protocol.  It MUST
 NOT be executed in any other time.  As it is performed after key exchange
 protocol all traffic in the connection authentication protocol is
 encrypted with the exchanged keys.
 
 The protocol MUST be started by the connecting party by sending the
 SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH packet with Connection Auth Payload,
 described in the next section.  This payload MUST include the
 authentication data.  The authentication data is set according
 authentication method that MUST be known by both parties.  If connecting
 party does not know what is the mandatory authentication method it MAY
 request it from the server by sending SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH_REQUEST
 packet.  This packet is not part of this protocol and is described in
 section Connection Auth Request Payload in [SILC2].  However, if
 connecting party already knows the mandatory authentication method
 sending the request is not necessary.
 
 See [SILC1] and section Connection Auth Request Payload in [SILC2] also
 for the list of different authentication methods.  Authentication method
 MAY also be NONE, in which case the server does not require
 authentication.  However, in this case the protocol still MUST be
 executed; the authentication data is empty indicating no authentication
 is required.
 
 If authentication method is passphrase the authentication data is
 plaintext passphrase.  As the payload is encrypted it is safe to have
 plaintext passphrase.  It is also provided as plaintext passphrase
 because the receiver may need to pass the entire passphrase into a
 passphrase verifier, and a message digest of the passphrase would
 prevent this.  See the section 3.2.1 Passphrase Authentication for
 more information.
 
 If authentication method is public key authentication the authentication
 data is a digital signature of the hash value of hash HASH and Key
 Exchange Start Payload, established by the SILC Key Exchange protocol.
 This signature MUST then be verified by the server.  See the section
 3.2.2 Public Key Authentication for more information.
 
 See the section 4 SILC Procedures in [SILC1] for more information about
 client creating connection to server, and server creating connection
 to router, and how to register the session in the SILC Network after
 successful Connection Authentication protocol.
 
 
 .ti 0
 3.1 Connection Auth Payload
 
 Client sends this payload to authenticate itself to the server.  Server
 connecting to another server also sends this payload.  Server receiving
 this payload MUST verify all the data in it and if something is to fail
 the authentication MUST be failed by sending SILC_PACKET_FAILURE packet.
 
 The payload may only be sent with SILC_PACKET_CONNECTION_AUTH packet.
 It MUST NOT be sent in any other packet type.  The following diagram
 represent the Connection Auth Payload.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .in 5
 .nf
                      1                   2                   3
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |        Payload Length         |        Connection Type        |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 |                                                               |
 ~                     Authentication Data                       ~
 |                                                               |
 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 .in 3
 
 .ce
 Figure 3:  Connection Auth Payload
 
 
 .in 6
 o Payload Length (2 bytes) - Length of the entire Connection
   Auth Payload.
 
 o Connection Type (2 bytes) - Indicates the type of the
   connection.  See section Connection Auth Request Payload
   in [SILC2] for the list of connection types.  This field MUST
   include valid connection type or the packet MUST be discarded
   and authentication MUST be failed.
 
 o Authentication Data (variable length) - The actual
   authentication data.  Contents of this depends on the
   authentication method known by both parties.  If no
   authentication is required this field does not exist.
 .in 3
 
 
 .ti 0
 3.2 Connection Authentication Types
 
 SILC supports two authentication types to be used in the connection
 authentication protocol; passphrase authentication or public key
 authentication based on digital signatures.  The following sections
 defines the authentication methods.  See [SILC2] for defined numerical
 authentication method types.
 
 
 .ti 0
 3.2.1 Passphrase Authentication
 
 Passphrase authentication or pre-shared key based authentication is
 simply an authentication where the party that wants to authenticate
 itself to the other end sends the passphrase that is required by
 the other end, for example server.  The plaintext passphrase is put
 to the payload, that is then encrypted.  The plaintext passphrase
 MUST be in UTF-8 [RFC2279] encoding.  If the passphrase is in the
 sender's system in some other encoding it MUST be UTF-8 encoded
 before transmitted.  The receiver MAY change the encoding of the
 passphrase to its system's default character encoding before verifying
 the passphrase.
 
 If the passphrase matches with the one in the server's end the
 authentication is successful.  Otherwise SILC_PACKET_FAILURE MUST be
 sent to the sender and the protocol execution fails.
 
 This is REQUIRED authentication method to be supported by all SILC
 implementations.
 
 When password authentication is used it is RECOMMENDED that maximum
 amount of padding is applied to the SILC packet.  This way it is not
 possible to approximate the length of the password from the encrypted
 packet.
 
 
 
 .ti 0
 3.2.2 Public Key Authentication
 
 Public key authentication may be used if passphrase based authentication
 is not desired.  The public key authentication works by sending a
 digital signature as authentication data to the other end, say, server.
 The server MUST then verify the signature by the public key of the sender,
 which the server has received earlier in SKE protocol, or which the
 server has cached locally at some previous time.
 
 The signature is computed using the private key of the sender by signing
 the HASH value provided by the SKE protocol previously, and the Key
 Exchange Start Payload from SKE protocol that was sent to the server.
 These are concatenated and hash function is used to compute a hash value
 which is then signed.
 
   auth_hash = hash(HASH | Key Exchange Start Payload);
   signature = sign(auth_hash);